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INTRODUCTION 
Utah Rule of Evidence 506 bars discovery of communications between doctor and 
patient and contains no enumerated exception for the disclosure of non-party patient 
medical records, with the patient's name and other "identifying information" redacted. 
St. Mark's made this point in its Opening Brief and Plaintiff does not dispute it. 
Nevertheless, despite the Advisory Committee's stated intention that "exceptions to the 
privilege should be specifically enumerated,"1 and this Court's holding in Burns v. 
Boy den, 133 P.3d 370, 377 (Utah 2006) that the only exceptions to the physician-patient 
privilege are those "specifically enumerated" in Rule 506(d), Plaintiff urges this Court to 
affirm the district court's order granting Plaintiffs Motion to Compel production of the 
redacted medical records of six non-party patients who have never been provided with 
notice of the ordered disclosure of their medical files. 
I. RULE 506 PROHIBITS THE DISCLOSURE OF THE NON-PARTY 
PATIENT MEDICAL RECORDS SOUGHT IN THIS CASE, 
A. The Plain Language Of Rule 506 Applies To Protect The Confidences 
Of The Six Non-Party Patients Whose Records Were Ordered 
Disclosed In This Case, 
Plaintiff does not dispute that the district court's production order compels St. 
Mark's to reveal the private, confidential medical information of six former hospital 
patients who are not parties to this case and have no interest in its outcome. Nor does 
Plaintiff dispute (PL Br. at 12, n.2) that the medical information contained in the records 
1
 In Burns v. Boyden, 133 P.3d 370 (Utah 2006), this Court stated that, "although not 
authoritative, the advisory committee notes to the Utah Rules of Evidence merit great 
weight in any interpretation of those rules." Id. at 377 n.6 (emphasis added). 
1 
of these six non-party patients falls squarely within the material expressly protected by 
Rule 506, namely -
(1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or 
mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the 
patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or 
mental health therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis 
or treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health therapist. 
U.R.E. 506(b) (West 2008). 
Nor does Plaintiff dispute that St. Mark's has standing to assert the physician-patient 
privilege on behalf of these six non-party patients whose records Plaintiff seeks to obtain 
(PL Br. at 12, n.2). Instead, Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief sets forth a variety of arguments in 
support of her assertion that the district court's ruling was not erroneous but, as set forth 
below, none are meritorious. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's 
order requiring disclosure of the six non-party patients' medical records. 
B. Plaintiff May Not Rely On The "At-Issue" Exception Because It Was 
Not Argued Below And Thus Presents No Issue For This Appeal. 
Aware of the Advisory Committee's notes and this Court's holding in Burns, 
supra, Plaintiffs Brief (PL Br. at 11) claims that one of the enumerated exceptions 
contained in Rule 506(d) applies, namely the "at issue" exception providing: 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as Element of Claim or Defense. As to a communication 
relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of 
the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of 
any claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings in 
which any party relies upon the condition as an element of the claim or 
defense; . . . . 
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U.R.E. 506(d)(1) (West 2008). 
Relying on this exception, Plaintiff argues that the district court's order must be 
affirmed because St. Mark's "failed to come forward with any explanation as to why the 
at issue exception does not apply." (PL Br. at 17). However, St. Mark's had no obligation 
to explain why the "at issue" exception does not apply in its Opening Brief because 
Plaintiff never raised that exception to the district court and the exception was not the 
basis of the district court's order. Thus, the issue is waived for this appeal. See Carrier 
v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208, 1219 (Utah 2004) (appellee waived for review issue 
concerning attorney's fees because appellee failed to raise issue before the district court). 
As this Court held in State v. Blake, 63 P.3d 56 (Utah 2002), a party attempting to 
invoke the "at issue" exception in Rule 506(d) must satisfy two high standards of proof: 
First, Plaintiff must establish through independent evidence that there is a 
reasonable certainty that the records protected by the physician-patient privilege 
contain information favorable to Plaintiffs case; and 
Second, the district court must then conduct an in camera inspection of the 
privileged records to determine their materiality, and then conclude that they 
contain evidence material to the case. Blake, 63 P.3d at 61-62. 
Here, because Plaintiff never raised the "at issue" exception below, she obviously 
made no attempt to meet either of these "stringent test[s]," Blake, 63 P.3d at 61. Plaintiff 
never introduced any extrinsic evidence establishing to a reasonable certainty that the six 
non-party patients' records at issue contain information favorable to Plaintiffs case and 
never submitted the documents to the district court for a materiality review. Accordingly, 
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the issue was not presented or preserved below, and there is no issue for this Court to 
review. 
C. In Any Event, The "AMssue" Exception Does Not Apply In This Case. 
While Plaintiffs failure to rely on the "at issue" exception below renders the point 
moot for this appeal, Plaintiffs belated "at-issue" argument should also be rejected on its 
face, because the non-party patients' medical conditions are not "an element of any claim 
or defense" in this case within the meaning of U.R.E. 506(d)(1). 
The plain language of the rule states that the "at-issue" exception to the physician-
patient privilege is limited to instances where the "condition of the patient in any 
proceeding" is an element of a claim or defense in the case. U.R.E. 506(d)(1) (emphasis 
added). This exception to the privilege is obviously intended to serve as a limitation on a 
party-patient's ability to prevent disclosure by claiming the privilege after placing his/her 
medical condition at issue as part of his/her claim or defense. It is a recognition of the 
policy that where a party places his/her physical, mental, or emotional condition at issue 
in a case, that party implicitly and necessarily waives his/her right to assert the privilege 
and prevent disclosure of his/her confidential medical information. See Clawson v. 
Walgreen Drug Co., 162 P.2d 759, 764 (Utah 1945) ("a patient cannot testify concerning 
what was said and done by his physician in the treatment of the injuries which are the 
subject of the litigation and then close the physician's mouth by claiming privilege."). 
That the exception applies only to a party who puts his or medical condition at 
issue is supported by the comments to the rule. The Advisory Committee explicitly states 
that "Rule 506 is modeled after Rule 503 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence." U.R.E. 
4 
506, Advisory Committee Note (West 2008). Rule 503 of the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence states that the exception applies when the communication at issue is "relevant 
to an issue of the [physical,] mental[,] or emotional condition of the patient in any 
proceeding in which the patient relies upon the condition as an element of the patient's 
claim or defense." UNIF. R. EVID. 503(d)(3). After limiting the scope of the exception to 
patients who put their medical conditions at issue while the patient is alive, the uniform 
rule then expands the scope of the exception after a patient's death to permit disclosure 
when any party puts that patient's medical condition at issue. UNIF. R. EVID. 503(d)(3). 
Plaintiff argues that the language used in Utah's Rule 506 evidences an intent by 
the courts in Utah to broaden the scope of the exception to include live parties who do not 
put their medical condition at issue. But the Advisory Committee Notes provide no 
indication of such an intent to deviate from the scope of the corresponding uniform rule. 
To the contrary, the fact that Utah's Rule 506(d)(1) replicates the distinction between 
living patients and deceased patients found in Uniform Rule 503(d)(3) makes clear that 
Utah's rule applies to permit disclosure of the confidences of live patients only where that 
patient puts their medical condition at issue. If that were not the case, the second half of 
the Utah rule which permits the disclosure of a deceased party's medical records where 
any party puts the patient's medical condition at issue would be superfluous. See Carter 
v. University of Utah Medical Center, 150 P.3d 467, 469 (Utah 2006) (interpretations that 
will render a portion of a statute superfluous or inoperative should be avoided). 
In any event, whether the rule applies only to the party who puts his or her medical 
condition at issue or to any party, there is no support for the argument advanced by the 
5 
plaintiff that the exception to the rule applies to all patients, even those who have no 
interest whatsoever in the litigation. As this Court discussed in Sorensen v. Barbuto, 111 
P.3d 614 (Utah 2008), the scope of the "at-issue" exception is limited: "rule 506(d)(1) is 
a limited waiver of privilege, confined to court proceedings, and restricted to the 
treatment related to the condition at issue" Id. at 617 (emphasis added). 
The few cases cited by Plaintiff, where this Court has applied the "at-issue" 
exception to the records of persons other than the plaintiff bringing a malpractice action, 
are consistent with this "related to the condition at issue" requirement. In State v. 
Cardall, 982 P.2d 79 (Utah 1999), and State v. Worthed 111 P.3d 664 (Ut. Ct. App. 
2008), the criminal defendant was permitted to raise the mental state of the victim - the 
complaining witness and on whose behalf (as well as her fellow state citizens) the State 
was prosecuting the defendant - because it was "an important element of [his] defense." 
Id at 86. 
The six non-party patients' records at issue in this case do not fall within the 
holding or rationale of Cardall, or Worthen. In criminal cases, the complaining victim is 
equivalent to the party who puts his or her medical condition at issue. Here, the non-
party patients have no connection whatsoever to the litigation. Moreover, as this Court 
noted in Cardall, there are constitutional protections that obligate the State to produce 
evidence to the defendant in a criminal trial. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie 480 U.S. 39, 57 
(1987); Cardall 982 P.2d 79 at 85. Such constitutional issues do not exist in a civil case 
such as this. In this case, at best, Plaintiff hopes (but never established) that these non-
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party patients' records might provide some tangential support for her negligent staffing 
claim - a claim that in itself is of dubious merit, see Point II, infra. 
Plaintiff also cites Debry v. Goates, 999 P.2d 582 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000) to support 
the applicability of the exception here. There, the court applied the exception to permit 
disclosure of communications a wife made to her therapist when she sought alimony 
against her husband. To the extent that case holds that disclosure was proper where the 
wife did not put her medical condition "at issue" that decision was not reviewed and has 
never been approved by this Court. Debry v. Goates, 999 P.2d 582 (Utah 2000), cert, 
denied, 9 P.3d 170, (Utah 2000). In any event, Derby's rationale does not apply here 
where the six patients are not even parties to the lawsuit, much less parties who put their 
medical condition at issue. 
Plaintiffs contrary interpretation of the "at-issue" exception would completely 
eviscerate the privilege and mean that the confidential medical information contained in 
any non-party patient's records could be disclosed to third parties upon the barest 
showing of any possible relevance to pending litigation - contrary to the express 
language of the Rule and the remedial purpose of the physician-patient privilege. Indeed, 
if such a minimal showing were all that is required, patients would no longer be the sole 
holders of the privilege with respect to their confidential medical information, contrary to 
Utah's recognition that the physician-patient privilege belongs to the patient, Debry, 999 
P.2d at 585, and "enables a patient to prevent a physician 'from disclosing diagnoses 
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made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician", Sorensen v. Barbuto, 177 
P.3d 614, 617 (Utah 2008)(emphasis added). 
D. Even Where A Statutory Exception Applies, The Patients Whose 
Records Are Sought Must Be Given Notice Of The Requested 
Disclosure. 
Plaintiffs belated "at-issue" exception argument is further groundless, because 
even where an exception to the physician-patient privilege is established under Rule 
506(d), the patient whose records are sought must first be given notice. Debry v. Goates, 
999 P.2d 582, 587-88 (Utah 2000) (before disclosing confidential patient records or 
communications, "a patient must at least be afforded the opportunity for protection" by 
receiving notice of the intended disclosure); State v. Yount, 182 P.3d 405, 409 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 2008) (a patient's right to notice of the requested disclosure of his/her confidential 
medical records "does not change even where the records allegedly contain 
communications that qualify as an exception to the physician-patient privilege"). Here it 
is undisputed that none of the non-party patients whose records Plaintiff seeks have ever 
been given notice of these proceedings, and thus they have never been afforded that 
required opportunity to protect the confidentiality of their medical records. 
E. Under Rule 506, Redaction Of The Patients' Names And Other 
"Identifying Information" From The Non-Party Patient Records Does 
Not Permit Disclosure Of The Personal And Confidential Medical 
Information Contained In Those Records. 
1. There Is No Redaction Exception To Rule 506. 
As she did below, Plaintiff refers this Court to the "vast majority" of states other 
than Utah that have permitted the disclosure of redacted medical records. But the 
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majority is not as "vast" as the Plaintiff claims, as several courts have reached the 
opposite conclusion, with many yet to address the issue. See e.g., Elkstrom v. Temple, 
197 111. App. 3d 120, 130 (2d Dist. 1990) (production of non-party patients' medical 
records prohibited under physician-patient privilege, even when identifying information 
is redacted); Davis v. American Home Products Corp., 727 So.2d 647, 650 (La. Ct. App. 
1999) (non-party patients' medical records are not discoverable even with identifying 
information redacted, absent statutory exception, consent from non-party patients, or 
contradictory hearing at which the non-party patients were present and represented by 
counsel); Popp v. Crittendom Hospital, 181 Mich. App. 662, 665 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) 
(physician-patient privilege is an absolute bar prohibiting the disclosure of medical 
records of non-party patients); Ortiz v. Ikeda, 2001 WL 660107 at 2 (Del. Super. Ct. 
2001) (court was not persuaded that redaction of identifying information adequately 
protects a patient's legitimate expectation of privacy); In re Columbia Valley Regional 
Medical Center, 41 S.W.3d 797, 800-801 (Tex. App. 2001) (redaction of identification 
information does not overcome protections of physician-patient privilege and render 
medical records discoverable); Yoe v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 2003 WL 549923 at 
3 (Ohio Ct. App, 2003) (because party had access to information from sources other than 
non-party patient medical records, physician-patient privilege barred disclosure of non-
party records); Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 
432222 at 1-2 (N.D.Cal. 2004) (disclosure of marginally relevant non-party patient 
medical records, even with all identifying information redacted, would violate the non-
party patients' right to privacy); Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital, 105 111. App. 3d 
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850, 855 (1st Dist. 1982) (disclosure of non-party patient medical records, even with the 
names and identifying numbers of the patients redacted, would violate the physician-
patient privilege); and Wozniakv. Kombrink, 1991 WL 17213 at 5 (Ohio App. Ct. 1991) 
(physician-patient privilege barred disclosure of non-party patient medical records, even 
with identifying information redacted). 
Moreover, counting cases from other states is an academic exercise. This case 
must be decided on the basis of Utah law and no other. This means that in order to avoid 
the physician-patient privilege set forth in Rule 506, Plaintiff must establish that the non-
party patient medical records sought here fall into one of the exceptions enumerated in 
Rule 506(d). This she has failed to do and, as set forth above, her belated attempt to 
invoke the "at issue" exception is procedurally and substantively improper. 
2. Redaction Does Not Provide The Requisite Notice To The Non-
Party Patients Or Ensure That The Confidentiality Of Their 
Medical Records Will Be Protected. 
Even with names redacted, the district court's order permits total strangers access 
to the non-party patients' most confidential, personal and intimate medical information 
concerning their "diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or 
mental health therapist," "information obtained by examination of the patient," and 
"information transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health therapists, and 
persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment" - the very information Rule 
506 expressly protects from disclosure - all without notice to those non-party patients. 
As set forth above, this is contrary to Utah law holding that even where (unlike here) an 
exception applies, the person whose medical records are at issue must still be given 
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notice before their protected information is disclosed. See State v. Yount, 182 P.3d 405, 
409 (Ut. Ct. App. 2008) (a patient's right to notice of the requested disclosure of his/her 
confidential medical records "does not change even where the records allegedly contain 
communications that qualify as an exception to the physician-patient privilege"). As 
stated in a case cited in Plaintiffs brief, Debry v. Goates, 999 P.2d 582, 587-88 (Utah 
App. 2000): 
As part of a therapeutic relationship, a doctor or therapist has an obligation 
to protect the confidentiality of his patients that transcends any duty he has 
as a citizen to voluntarily provide information that might be relevant in 
pending litigation. Before disclosing confidential patient records or 
communications in a subsequent litigation, a physician or therapist should 
notify the patient. Even if the communications may fall into this exception 
to the privilege, the patient has the right to be notified of the potential 
disclosure of confidential records. Such notice assures that the patient can 
pursue the appropriate procedural safeguards in court to avoid unnecessary 
disclosure. 
Debry, 999 P.2d at 587-88 (emphasis added). 
In addition, no one can be certain that deletion of the non-party patients' names 
and "other identifying information" would in all cases preclude the patients from being 
identified. As recognized by other courts, redaction does not necessarily safeguard the 
non-party patients' confidentiality or their expectation of privacy in their medical records. 
See Ekstrom v. Temple, 197 111. App. 3d 120, 130 (2d Dist. 1990) (deletion of patient 
identifying information "may not sufficiently protect the confidentiality to which the 
nonparty patients are entitled"); Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital, 105 111. App. 3d 
850, 855 (1st Dist. 1982) ("Whether the patients' identities would remain confidential by 
the exclusion of their names and identifying numbers is questionable at best."); Wozniak 
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v. Kombrink, 1991 WL 17213 at 5 (Ohio App. Ct. 1991) (physician-patient privilege 
barred disclosure of non-party medical records, even with identifying information 
redacted, because the risk of disclosing a patient's identity could "not be entirely 
eliminated" through redaction of identifying information). 
Burns v. Boyden, 133 P.3d 370 (Utah 2006), is not to the contrary, and Plaintiffs 
reliance on Burns (PL Br. at 20) disregards the substantially dissimilar circumstances 
between Burns and the present case. In Burns, it was law enforcement officials who 
sought non-party patient medical records as part of their criminal investigation 
concerning alleged insurance fraud on the part of the defendant physician, not litigants in 
a civil medical malpractice lawsuit. Thus, the Burns court held that the defendant 
physician was not even entitled to the presumption that he had the authority to raise the 
physician-patient privilege on behalf of the non-party patients. 133 P. 3d at 379. Plaintiff 
concedes that there is no such issue here, and that St. Mark's has the right to raise the 
physician-patient privilege on behalf of the six non-party patients whose records Plaintiff 
seeks. (PL Br. at 12, n.2). 
Further, as this Court recognized in Burns, Utah Code section 31A-31-104( 1 )(b) 
requires "an insurer . . . [to] release to [an] authorized agency . . . infarmation or evidence 
that is relevant to any suspected insurance fraud." Burns, 133 P.3d at 379. Because 
disclosure is required by law, this Court concluded that "it is doubtful that patients have 
any expectation that the privilege would shield their records from law enforcement 
officials in a case" involving suspected insurance fraud, but instead "would expect that 
their insurance company could assist law enforcement to respond to that activity" by 
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disclosure of their medical records. Id. at 379. Conversely, in a case such as this which 
does not involve evidence of a crime or law enforcement officials seeking patient medical 
records or a statute requiring disclosure, non-party patients' expectations that their 
intimate medical records will not be disclosed without their knowledge or consent remain 
steadfast. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S PURPORTED NEED FOR THE NON-PARTY 
PATIENT RECORDS IS BOTH IRRELEVANT AND UNFOUNDED. 
A. Rule 506 Contains No "Need" Exception. 
Plaintiffs argument about her "need" for the non-party patient records (PL Br. at 
24-29) is in essence another attempt to create an exception to Rule 506 that does not 
exist. Rule 506 contains no "need" exception. Again, under Burns, the only exceptions to 
the physician-patient privilege are those "specifically enumerated" in Rule 506(d), 133 
P.3d at 377. As this Court recognized in Blake, 63 P. 3d at 61, it is the "very nature" of 
all privileges, including the physician-patient privilege, that certain facts or information, 
while true, may never be revealed. This is recognized as a "good policy choice [], 
fostering candor in important relationships by promising protection of confidential 
disclosures." Id. 
Furthermore, as set forth below, Plaintiffs "need" arguments are as unfounded as 
they are irrelevant. 
B. Plaintiff Misapprehends This Court's Holding in Clover v. Snowbird 
Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). 
In her Brief, Plaintiff asserts that this Court's holding in Clover stands for the 
proposition that "a plaintiff may pursue a direct-liability claim against an employer 
13 
'regardless' of the employee's status." (PL Br. at 25). Plaintiff misapprehends this 
Court's holding. In Clover, an employment relationship was denied. In this context, this 
Court held that even if the purported employee was acting outside the scope of 
employment so as not to impute liability to the employer, an employer can still be held 
directly liable for its own negligence in hiring and supervising employees. Here there is 
no employment issue. St. Mark's has already admitted an employment relationship and 
its responsibility for the acts/omissions of Nurse Stallings in caring for Plaintiff. Thus, 
Nurse Stallings' acts have become its own and St. Mark's liability is solely dependent on 
whether those acts/omissions were negligent and a proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries. 
Therefore, if Plaintiff fails to establish that St. Mark's nursing staff, including Angela 
Stallings, was negligent and that said negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiffs 
injuries, there is no basis to find St. Mark's liable for negligent staffing. See the cases 
cited in St. Mark's Opening Brief (pp. 16-17). 
Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions (PI. Br. at 25-26), the negligent staffing claim 
will have no effect on the jury's ability to apportion fault between St. Mark's and Dr. 
Jolles under Utah's comparative fault statutes. As discussed above, Plaintiffs 
understaffing claim cannot stand alone, and by itself can impose no liability on St. 
Mark's. With or without the negligent staffing claim, Plaintiff cannot recover against St. 
Mark's unless she proves that St. Mark's nursing staff violated the standard of care in the 
care and treatment they rendered to Plaintiff and that such standard of care violation was 
a proximate cause of Plaintiffs injuries. Thus, if causal fault is assessed against St. 
Mark's at all, it will be based on Plaintiffs proof of her nursing negligence claim, and her 
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negligence staffing claim will not provide any separate basis upon which to apportion 
fault to St. Mark's. 
C. The Non-Party Patient Records Are Irrelevant To Plaintiffs Punitive 
Damages Claim, 
In her Brief, Plaintiff argues that she "may also assert an understaffing claim 
because plaintiff seeks punitive damages against St. Mark's based on its knowing and 
reckless failure to staff the hospital with sufficient nurses" and that "the non-party 
medical records are directly relevant to [her] claim for punitive damages." (PL Br. at 26) 
(emphasis added). 
Plaintiff has been allowed to file a punitive damages claim over St. Mark's 
objection, (R. 689-703). But Plaintiffs claim that she needs the non-party patient 
medical records to determine the non-party patients' acuity to support her punitive 
damages claim, manifests either a lack of understanding of "patient acuity" or a lack of 
understanding of the kind of conduct Plaintiff must prove in order to recover punitive 
damages against St. Mark's. Plaintiffs punitive damages theory, as alleged in her 
Amended Complaint (R.704-11), is that St. Mark's management knowingly and 
recklessly understaffed St. Mark's for budgetary reasons. See Hodges v. Gibson Products 
Co., 811 P.2d 151, 163 (Utah 1991). 
An individual patient's acuity on a particular night is not relevant to this 
determination. The evidence relevant to such management staffing issue is the 
information contained in St. Mark's Staffing Patterns Table, the patient census sheet, the 
charge reports and the staff matrix materials (R.966-993, 1030), which have already been 
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provided to Plaintiff and relied upon by Plaintiffs expert in rendering opinions on this 
staffing management issue. (R.310-11). Patient acuity, on the other hand, pertains to the 
individual patient's condition and the amount of nursing care that condition requires. 
As established by the affidavit of How-Su Chen, the nursing manager of the 4 W 
unit at St. Mark's, patient acuity is something that is assessed in terms of a patient's 
particular needs during a particular nursing shift, and can change from shift to shift, or 
even hour to hour or moment to moment within a shift. (Affidavit, p.3) (R. 1055). It is 
determined primarily from oral discussions with the patients' nursing care providers on 
the scene, (Affidavit pp. 3-4) (R. 1055), and can result in the staffing on the unit being 
rearranged during a shift, calling in nurses from other floors, or transferring patients to 
another floor where more nursing care is available. (Affidavit, pp.3-4)(R. 1055-56). The 
individual factors considered are the need for complex technology and equipment, 
wound-drain care, medication administration, pain level, vital signs, dependent care 
needs, mobility, psychosocial-emotional status and family dynamics, to name a few. 
(Affidavit, p. 3) (R.1055). It was in this context that How-Su Chen stated in her affidavit 
that patient acuity would be one of many factors to determine whether the staffing was 
appropriate at any given point in time.-
None of these on-the-spot staffing decisions involving patient acuity are the 
management type decisions that form the basis for Plaintiffs punitive damage claim in 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. Thus, Plaintiffs claim that she needs to determine the 
- Obviously, if this Court reverses the district court's order compelling St. Mark's to 
produce the non-party patients' medical records, St. Mark's will not seek to introduce any 
testimony of How-Su Chen based on her review of those records. (PI. Br. at 16-17). 
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non-party patients' acuity to sustain her punitive damages claim is legally and factually 
erroneous. Again, the managerial staffing decisions that are the subject of her punitive 
damages claim are done without accounting for individual patient acuity, (Deposition of 
Melissa Lewis, p. 18) (R.661), and Plaintiff has all the evidence relevant to that issue. (R. 
966-993, 1030). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in St. Mark's Opening Brief, this Court should 
reverse the district court's order compelling St. Mark's to disclose non-party patient 
records, and hold that Utah's physician-patient privilege bars any disclosure of the non-
party patient medical records sought in this case. 
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